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PREFACE 
Hobart is the only capital city in Australia where water is 
supplied to the consumers unmetered. A flat rate is charged 
annually in return for which consumers may take virtually unlimited 
water. There seems to be a prevalent belief that water should not 
be sold to the community of Hobart on the basis of consumption 
because of the natural abundance of water in Tasmania. This view 
is reflected in the 'requirements approach' used by the Metropolitan 
Water Board in planning supply expansions. What is little realised 
is that the source of Hobart's water (although virtually inexhaustible) 
is situated a fairly great distance away from the metropolitan area. 
Transporting water through pipelines over long distances is not a 
cost-less affair and by virtue of this fact, water must be looked 
upon and treated as an economic good. 
This study has a three-fold objective. Firstly, it is to 
examine the efficacy of the present investment criteria used by the 
Metropolitan Water Board. The potential of the requirements approoch 
to allocate society's resources efficiently is assessed. The price 
variable is suggested as a means of exercising water demand 
management and the second objective is to compare the efficiency of 
a marginal cost pricing approach with the requirements approach in 
0 
tel~s of resource allocation. 
Finally, no matter how superior a marginal cost pricing policy 
may be to the present flat-rate policy theoretically, it needs to be 
proven that the costs involved in implementing such a scheme do not 
outweigh the benefits. To this end, a cost-benefit analysis is 
conducted to determine whether or-not universal metering should be 
introduced in Hobart. 
The cost-benefit analysis implicitly compares the two alternatives 
available to water authorities to meet demand after 1978/9 when 
the present supply is expected to reach full capacity. These are 
whether to dup 1 i cate the Derwent Water Supply Scheme and thus 
continue the flat-rate method of charging or to introduce metering 
and to implement a marginal cost pricing policy. The cost-benefit 
study measures the costs of accepting the latter alternative and 
matches them against the benefits which are in fact the savings 
that would accrue from rejecting the former proposition. 
The study incorporates a modified version of Williamson 1 S 
model which is designed to determine when capacity (with the 
indivisibility constraint) should be expanded under a marginal 
cost pricing policy. This is necessary in order to estimate the 
savings that would result from deferring capital expenditure on 
a new pipeline. 
The introductory chapter covers the first t1t10 objectives of the 
study. It is 2rgued that the price variable, properly used, 
would be an effective tool for demand management with the ultimate 
aim of achieving an efficient allocation of resources. The chapter 
also discusses some of the limitations of a marginal cost pricing 
rule. 
Chapter 2 provides the analytical framework for the cost-
benefit analysis. The choice of the cost-benefit tool and its 
superiority over traditional methods of evaluating projects are 
discussed. The rationale behind Williamson 1 s model for developing 
appropriate investment criteria is explained. 
In Chapter 3 the assumptions underlying the cost-benefit 
analysis are spelt out. It is believed that the dependability of 
the results rests ultimately on the validity of the assumptions 
made. Hence, a proper justification of each assumption is necessary. 
The chapter also explains how a demand function for excess-water 
was improvised for Hobart in the absence of a marginal pricing 
system. 
(v) 
Chapters 4 and 5 are concerned with the quantification of the 
costs and benefits respectively of metering. Calculations \vere done 
under two alternative assumptions regarding future growth in the 
demand for water. Also, four discount rates \vere employed for 
sensitivity analysis. 
Chapter 6 presents a summary of the results and the conclusions 
of the study. The cost-benefit analysis ~hawed that metering in 
fact is preferable to duplicating the trunkline. It is concluded 
that although the State government appeared adamant in its intention 
to proceed with the pipeline project, this study would hopefully 
serve to indicate the type of analysis that could assist in 
making the optimal decision when faced with a similar situation 
in future . 
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1.1 Objective 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1977 the Metropolitan Water Board, which is responsible 
for the supply of water to Hobart, made a submission to the 
Tasmanian Parliament with the proposal to install water meters 
in the Metropolitan Area. Submissions were also made subsequently 
by the municipal Councils in the Metropolitan Area which generally 
opposed the Board's idea. Eventually the Metropolitan Water Board's 
proposal was rejected by Parliament. 
The objective of this study is three-fold. Firstly, it is 
to examine the present philosophy behind Hobart's water supply. 
An assessment is made of the investment criteria used by the 
Metropol~tan Water Board, a public enterprise producing an 
economic good (water). Secondly, it is to evaluate the advantages 
of that enterprise adopting an alternative basis for decision 
making. It is argued that a marginal cost pricing system would 
provide a more efficient basis for investment decisions. Finally, 
having compared the existing policy with the suggested alternative~ 
the feasibility of exercising demand management of Hobart 4 S 
wate~ resources through the price variable is examined. This entails 
a reconsideration of the Board•s proposal to meter consumers. 
1.2 Hobart•s Water Supply System 
Under the Metropolitan Water Act (1961), the responsibility 
of providing a continual supply of water to the Metropolitan area 
of Hobart was vested in the Metropolitan Water Board (MWB). This 
area comprises the cities of Hobart and Glenorchy, and the urban 
portions of Clarence and Kingborough municipalities. The note-
worthy feature of Hobart's water supply system is that its two 
1. 
v 
If it is assumed that water is J 1 Special • commodity, one 
whose consumption should not be inhibited by such factors as crice, 
then perhaps the requirements approach can be justified. The 
unrestricted availability of water for both domestic and trade 
purposes undoubtedly assists the growth of the urban areas. In 
this respect the traditional policy of Hobart•s water supply 
authority deserves credit; Hobart has experienced fairly rapid 
development and the standard of living enjoyed by its people is 
comparable to that of any other major city in Australia. 
1.4 Need for Demand Manaoement 
In the present context however, the requirements approach to 
the su~ply of water is untenable for Hobart. Whilst it was once 
possible to expand supply at a relatively low cost, the cost of 
further augmenting capacity has increased sharply. As seen above, 
to expand Hobart•s water sucply any further would require the 
construction of pipelines which extend over great distances and 
possibly the enlargement of storage and pumping facilities. This 
increase in the cost of providing a ready supply of fresh, clean 
water the tap has forced a change in the conceptual view of 
water: 
11 Water has evo 1 ved from a free oood, an i tern that can be 
enjoyed without foregoing other-resources, to that of an 
economic good, in which sacrifices of other goods are 
required. The term 'economic good' carries with it the 
connotation of relative scarcity, which is a reflection of 
the interplay between \vants and sources 11 • [24, p.l359/60]. 
If this view is accepted, then it is only logical that water be 
treated in the same way as other economic goods. 
In a situation where various economic goods are competing 
for limited investment funds, the criterion behind the requirements 
approach is clearly inefficient as a basis for decision making. 
Under the present system, the marginal cost of use of water is 
3. 
4. 
zero (or negligible), whilst the marginal cost to provide water 
is relatively high. This is a characteristic feature of a flat-rate 
pricing system. Referring to this system, Rees has pointed out 
that it is a basic barrier to economic efficiency in the performance 
of water undertakings, 
" .... the water they supply is typically underpriced, the·ir 
capacity overexpanded, and resources (water, construction 
equipment, land and labour) are being diverted away from 
uses valued more highly on the margin by consumers ..... There 
appear to be no rational grounds for allowing water supplies 
to be extended to meet all forseeable 'needs', when the 
supply of most other commodities is only increased when the 
consumers are prepared to pay for the increase by foregoing 
alternative goods.'' (41,pp.21, 28). 
The 'externality' argument is sometimes forwarded to support 
the present philosophy behind Hobart's system of water charging and 
investment in supply capacity. This argument stems from the fear 
that if a payment-by-use scheme is introduced, the use of water 
will be deterred with consequent harmful effects on peoples 1 
health. Looked at in the context of an affluent society, the 
argument is not convincing. 
11 For one thing, the fear that i ndi vi dua 1 s v1i 11 endanger their 
own health presupposes a degree of irrationality among 
consumers that is orocably unjustified - and in this particular 
case, this will ke care of the externality problem as VJell." 
( 48' p. 2 30 ] . 
Furthermore, the attitude that water is a commodity possessing a 
'unique importance' has been challenged. As Hirshleifer has 
pointed out, food and clothing are also vital to life and yet we 
have adjusted to the idea that the purchaser must be prepared to 
pay the going price to satisfy his wants. [26, pp.4-5]. 
Another criticism of the flat-rate method of charging for 
water is that it encourages wasteful use. The ortimisation of 
consumer satisfaction requires that an individual purchase additional 
units of any item until the incremental benefits equal the 
incremental costs to the consumer. This means that the unmetered 
user in Hobart takes water unti 1 the r~argi na l va 1 ue is zero. 
Correction of wastage would impose costs upon consumers without 
yielding them benefits. [49, p.178]. Seen as a commodity the 
provision of which requires use of scarce public funds, the 
efficient use of water is necessary for economic efficiency. A 
comparison of domestic water demands in Hobart, the West Tamar 
Water Supply and the North Esk Regional Scheme reveal that the 
quantity of water used per connection is much higher in 
Metropolitan Hobart than in the metered Northern areas of 
Tasmania (see Appendix 1). It is argued, therefore, that in the 
face of increasing demands and costs it is becoming more important 
to enquire whether the optimal allocation of resources through 
(marginal) pricing is relevant to planning and management in 
this field. It is important to ascertain to what extent 
consumers are prepared to pay the incremental cost that an 
addition to the water supply system necessitates. [40, p.l57]. 
5. 
Ciriacy-Wantrup [13] concluded that conventional 'requirements' 
calculations may yield a satisfactory result only if two necessary 
and sufficient conditions apply: 
1~\ . ~ t \'J constan~ cos s, 
(ii) perfectly ine1astic demand. 
In the case of Hobart, it is difficult to prove that either of 
these conditions is met. Considering the fact that the costs 
of future expansions to the city's water supply system are more 
likely to increase than remain constant, an upward sloping long 
run marginal (and hence average) cost curve would exist. The 
main reason why this is so is that as water consumption increases, 
the Board (MWB) might find it necessary to exploit sources 
that are less and less accessible. 
As for the price elasticity of demand for water, a p~:or~ 
it is impossible to determine in the absence of a price structure 
based on consumption. Studies conducted in other countries yield 
no conclusive results. However, the experience of the West Tamar 
may be relevant for Hobart, since the climatic and other factors 
affecting demand for water are not significantly different in the 
two areas. Before metering was completed, the average daily 
demand per connection in the West Tamar area was 1 100 (1962/3), 
1 310 ('63/64) and 1 810 ('64/5) litres. Upon completion of the 
metering scheme and implementation of an effective pricing policy, 
"average demands have been between 1300 and 1500 litres per day 11 • 
[7, p.4]. Based on this and similar experiences reported in other 
parts of Tasmania (e.g. Burnie, North Esk area), it is hypothesized 
that the price variable would in fact have a bearing on the 
consumption of water in Hobart. 
1.5 Price Variable as a Tool of Demand Manaaement 
The 'requirements 1 approach as argued above, generally leads 
to wasteful use of water and inefficient allocation of resources. 
In order to overcome these shortcomings, clearly some form of 
urban water demand management is needed. Gallagher and Robinson 
recently reported tDat 
"water price, through the \vater demand function, has the 
potential to be an effective policy tool in the hands of 
innovative water supply authorities. Through the adoption 
of an appropriate water price policy, water supply 
authorities should achieve more effective and efficient 
control of water supply and vJater useu. [19, p.l]. 
Under certain restrictive conditions 2 , it can be shown that 
2. According to Collard [14, p.71] these conditions are: 
(i) Conditions appropriate to perfect competition prevail 
throught the whole of the rest of the economic system. 
(ii) Consumers are best judges of their own interests, 
(iii) The distribution of incomes is equitable, 
(iv) There are no relevant externalities. 
6. 
efficiency in output for a public (as well as private) 
enterprise is achieved by equating price with the marginal 
cost of production 3 • Warford [48, pp.219-222] also shows how 
a marginal pricing scheme can be utilised to formulate criteria 
for investment in capacity. These criteria involve an explicit 
assessment of the value of the additional water made available. 
New investment in capacity (for the case of perfect divisibility) 
is justified only when quantity demanded exceeds the point where 
price equals short and long run marginal costs. 
Marginal cost pricing has certain limitations the discussion 
of which is well documented in the literature. (See for example 
14, ch. 8). Suffice it to say, these limitations can be overcome 
by pricing policies which are at best, modifications of the 
margindl cost pricing rule. For example, under certain conditions, 
a marginal cost pricing policy would result in the enterprise 
making financial losses. This problem can be overcome by 
imposing a 'tvw part tariff 1 whereby the consumer pays a fixed 
charge per period plus a charge that varies with the amount used. 
Perhaps the most serious doubt related to the marginal cost 
efficiency principle has become known in the literature as the 
problem of 'second best'. The Second Best Theorem proves that if 
any of the conditions for Pareto optimality4 under the marginal 
cost pricing rule are not met, then in general, equating price 
with narginal cost may not produce the allocative efficiency 
desired. [31}. Under circumstances where prices everywhere are 
not equal to marginal costs, the welfare maximisation problem has 
to be reformulated and an alternative optimal pricing policy 
3. See for example Henderson and Quandt [23]. 
4. A Pareto-optimal (or socially efficient) allocation of resources 
is one which cannot be altered without someone being made worse 
off. [ 12, p. 1 J • 
7. 
derived. The way in which the alternative solution is obtained 
has been dealt with in the literature [see for example 9 and 11]. 
The point of concern to us here is how serious is the second-best 
problem in regard to the public enterprise producing water. 
Davis and Whinston [17,18] have explored the conditions 
under which a 'piecemeal approach' to policy is justified, i.e. 
formulating a marginal cost pricing policy for the economic 
enterprise under study when the Pareto conditions may not be 
fulfilled in some other parts of the economy. Briefly their view 
is that 
"in determination of appropriate pricing policies that 
which is not known about the fulfilment or not of the 
optimum conditions e 1 sev1here in the economy shou 1 d be 
ignored. But that which is known and is important 
should be taken into account." [50, p.46J. 
Now, we know that water is both a final good to households 
and an intermediate good to industries. However, it may be 
argued that since most water is supplied to households, the 
pricing behaviour of firms may not pose a serious setback to 
achieving efficiency through marginal cost pricing. On the 
other hand, we could assume that the majority of products used 
by households, vJhich may be either complements or substitutes 
of water, are priced above their marginal costs. Hence, with 
the marginal price of water currently set at zero (i.e. well 
below the marginal cost) we have a sub-optimal situation. The 
sub-optimality arises because there is an over-use of the 
complements of water (and hence the resources employed in their 
production) and an under-use of the substitutes of water (with a 
consequent under-use of the corresponding resources). 
Therefore we argue that a movement of the price of water 
towards the true marginal cost would have the effect of reducing 
the sub-optimal bias in the economy, although it is still 
unlikely that the resulting situation will be Pareto-optimal. 
8. 
The other method of exercising management of water demand 
is of course by imposing restrictions on the use of water at 
certain times. These restrictions (e.g. cutting off of supplies 
or reduction of pressure) could have severe disruptive effects 
on productive processes and impose a threat to public hygiene 
and health, which "could in principle be quantified, but there 
is a prima facie case for supposing that the costs entailed would 
outweigh those of, for example, the installation of domestic 
meters". [ 48, p. 225). 
As Grima [22, p.6) concludes, 
11 It is preferable to use price as an instrument of policy 
in such a way as to reduce those uses of residential water 
that the consumer values less than the cost to the community 
of providing the service. This approach leaves the 
consumer with the choice of exercising his right to buy 
more water at a price that reflects its cost; at the same 
time the management makes use of non-arbitrary criteria in 
attempting to allocate resources efficiently to the 
development of residential water supplie.G." 
1.6 Definition of Problem 
A payment-by-use system, while superior to the present 
system in Hobart on the grounds of efficiency is, however, not 
cost-less to implement. Certain costs must be incurred if 
demand management is to be exercised through an effective price 
mechanism. Therefore, in what follows, our chief aim is t~ 
enumerate and measure these costs and to weigh them against the 
benefits derived from removing or reducing wasteful use of 
water in Hobart. Since metering is the sole means of implementing 
any pricing policy based on consumption, our fundamental question 
becomes: 
Should Hobart•s water consumotion be metered? 
As explained in the next chapter this question can best be 
9. 
answered through the application of cost-benefit analysis techniques. 
CHAPTER 2 
THE FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS 
2.1 Cost-Benefit Analvsis 
Cost-benefit analysis is coming to be applied to a wide 
variety of public projects to determine their economic feasibility. 
11 By marshalling data systematically, putting it in 
quantitative terms wherever appropriate, and rendering 
it as commensurable as possible, it lays bare the 
considerations relevant to a complex decision in a 
manner which provides policy-makers with a much more 
intelligible and comprehensive view of the situation 
than is possible by imy other means. 11 [47, p.3]. 
The cost-benefit approach differs from the traditional 
methods of investment appraisal (used mainly by the private 
sector) in that it emphasizes the social costs 5 and benefits 
attributable to the project. The older methods on the other 
hand tend to restrict themselves to just the financial 
considerations. In general a public project gives rise to 
intangible costs and benefits which should be given due 
consideration if the true economic and social worth of the 
project to society ~s to be determined. As such the methodology 
of cost-benefit analysis is most appropriate for examining the 
public project under discussion in our study~ i.e. metering 
of Hobart 1 s water supply. 
Extensive use of the cost-benefit approach has been made 
in the field of water resources, where the occurence of 
secondary effects is a characteristic feature. Of special 
relevance to the metering issue, however, there exist only a 
few studies of recent date. This is possibly due to the fact 
5. 1 Social costs 1 have been defined as the "sum total of the 
costs of an economic action. 11 [39, p.18]. By this definition, 
they would include private costs which are those costs that 
affect the decisions of the performers of the action. 
10. 
11. 
that most large cities (at least in Australia and the U.S.) have 
had their water supplies metered for a long time. Of those 
examined, the one of New York's water supply seemed most pertinent 
to our situation. In New York's case too the authorities were faced 
with supply operating at capacity and the dilemma of whether to 
make more efficient use of existing supplies through metering or 
to expand capacity by the building of a new dam. 6 The approach in 
the present study is broadly similar to that in the latter, with 
certain modifications to suit our purposes. 
2.2 Existina Studies of Hobart 
The Metropolitan Water Board first approached the metropolitan 
councils on the question of metering in 1964. Subsequent approaches 
were made in 1966, 1969, 1973, 1974 and finally in 1977 its 
proposal was debated in Parliament. These submissions (at least 
the last four) were accompanied by the MWB's financial calculations 
which, based on the premise that the immediate installation of 
meters would defer the need to invest in additional supply capacity, 
generally produced the result that metering was cheaper than 
maintaining an unmetered supply system. 
The MWB also engaged consultants ,; to undertake a comprehensive 
economic and engineering study of the metering proposal" in 1974 
[3, p.6]. This study arrived at the conclusion that 
"an early investment in a trunkline, without any reduction 
in consumption ... is favoured over solutions with 
reduced consumption due to the installation of a universal 
metering systen1. 11 7 
6. The Rand Study. See [32, pp.69-72]. Other cities where an 
economic evaluation of metering was carried out are for 
example Toronto and Etobicoke, both in Canada [22]. 
7. Report by W.O. Scott and Co. Pty. ltd. [8, p.16]. Henceforth 
referred to as the Scott Report. 
The findings of the consultants were not accepted by the MWB for 
three main reasons: 
r • ) \ 1 the MWB did not agree with the "unrealistic" 
assumptions of future inflation made by the consultants, 
which had a significant effect on their results, 
(ii) the consultants had not considered the national or 
state priorities in the allocation of funds for 
capital works, and 
(iii) the failure to account for the expenditure which would 
be required to distribute the additional supply of 
water (from a new trunkline) to households. [3, pp.6,7]. 
The other major economic study of the issue, conducted by the 
Hobart City Counci 1 (HCC), was contained in its submission to the 
Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works [2]. It 
supported the findings of the Scott Report with its own cost 
calculations of the two alternatives: metering or building a 
new trunkline. This report raised a number of issues regarding 
the technique and data used by the MWB in its calculations. The 
MWB in turn quest·ioned the 11iay in which the HCC had conducted its 
present value calculations r 111 l.,. J • In this study \Ve aim to examine 
so~ne of these theoretical issues and to extend the analysis, 
taking into account any intangible gains and losses through 
metering. 
2.3 Nature of Costs and Benefits 
Faced with the question of whether or not Hobart's water 
supply should be metered, clearly an objective approach would 
be to weigh the benefits of such a scheme against its costs using 
the cost-benefit tool. This is precisely the analysis carried 
out in the present study. In attempting to answer the question 
12. 
above we shall be making the implicit assumption that the 
alternative to metering consumers is to duplicate the DervJent v:ater 
Supply pipeline immediately. Therefore, should the measured 
benefits of metering fall short of the costs involved (all in 
money terms), the correct decision would be to proceed directly 
with the construction of the new trunkline and consider metering 
an uneconomic proposition. 
Because we are considering only the two alternatives, namely 
metering and non-metering, the 'benefits • oft he metering project 
would consist of the costs of the non-metering project not 
incurred. In other words, the benefits of metering Hobart's 
water supplies are the negative costs of constructing the new 
pipeline and allowing an unrestricted use of water at zero 
marginal cost to the consumer. 
In this section, we shall outline broadly the costs and 
' .~ benefits which will enter our analysis. Table Z below lists the 
cost and benefit items, following which are some explanatory 
remarks on each item. These are then quantified in Chaoters4 and 
5 to follow. 
TABLE l 
CJsts and Benefits of Metering Hobart's Water Supplie~v 
Costs Benefits 
13. 
Cl Purchase and installation 81 Non-installation of new pipeline 
of meters. 
C2 Reading, Billing and 
B2 Non-imposition of restrictions 
before completion of new 
Maintenance of Meters. pipeline 
C3 Loss of Consurmers• Surplus B3 Avoidance of operational costs 
C4 Operational Costs of of producing excess water with 
producing excess water. new pipeline. 
14. 
COSTS: 
Cl Purchase and Installation of Meters 
The capital cost of the project comprises the material cost 
of household meters and the labour cost of installation on premises. 
It is believed that full-metering in Hobart (i.e. the metering of 
every connection, with the exception of certain places like lock 
up shops, etc.) can be achieved over a span of 3-4 years, requiring 
an estimated 46 000 domestic meters. Once universal metering is 
attained an additional number of new meters would be needed each 
year for new connections. 
C2 Reading, Billing and Maintenance of Meters 
Personnel would have to be employed to read meters regularly, 
bill customers and conduct maintenance work on faulty meters. 
These activities could be performed from a centralised office to 
minimise administrative costs. This also implies that all the 
municipalities to be metered could be served from the one office. 
Costs in this category would be incurred directly after the 
installation of meters, i.e. from the first year of ~he metering 
program. Thus, while part of the Metropolitan Area will be 
charged for their usage of water, other parts will still be 
charged on the ~asis of their property rates. As commented in 
the Scott Report [8, p.l3], this is standard practice elsewhere 
and if the installation is carried out by homogeneous geographic 
areas, it would be more acceptable to consumers. 
C3 Drop in Consumers• Surplus 
This cost is based on the notion that an increase in the 
marginal price of water from zero to a positive value will lead 
consumers to consume less water. In doing so, the consumers 
would be incurring a loss of what has been termed 'consumers• 
surplus' in economic theory. The concept was first expounded 
by ;\lfred Marshall [33, Ch. 6]. He defined the consumer 1 s surplus 
as 11 the excess of the price which he would be willing to pay 
rather than go without the thing, over that which he actually 
does pay 11 • [33, p.124]. 
Consumers 1 surplus is usually measured by the area under the 
demand curve and above the prevai'ling price level, as illustrated 
below. We note here a peculiarity of the demand for water in the 
regions covered by our study. As in other capital cities around 
Australia, households in the metered areas of Tasmania pay two 
rates for the water they consume: a minimum charge annually for a 
fixed amount of water known as the 'basic allowance 1 and a price 
per unit of water consumed in excess of the basic allowance. A 
demand curve drawn for an area with such a pricing system will 
necessarily apply only to the 'excess water' consumed. The use of 
an excess-demand curve in place of a total-demand curve does not 
affect our analysis of consumers' surplus as long as we assume 
?rice of 
;;:xcess I 
1-.'a ter I 
(iiKl) ~ 
R 
FIG1JRE 1 
CONSt~ERS' SURPLUS 
15. 
Total Excess 
Water 0 '------------~-------~T ....... .......,_,......,......,.....,.._ in Year t 
(Hl) 
that the imposition of a marginal price for excess water will 
only curtail the use of excess ~vater and leave the consumption of 
the basic allowance unchanged. 
·In Fig. 1, consumers purchase quantity Q1 of excess water, 
in year t say, at the prevailing price P1 • The section RS of 
16. 
the downward sloping demand curve shows however that they would have 
been willing to pay higher prices for quantities of water less than 
Q1 • The net advantage to consumers of being able to buy all their 
desired units at price P1 is therefore represented by the shaded 
t ri an g 1 e , P 1 SR. 
Assuming the quantity of excess water consumed in the absence 
of metering was OT (price is zero) and after metering is OQ 1 , the 
change in consumers' surplus is shown by the area OTSP 1 • However, 
consumers no\'/ pay a total of OQ 1SP 1 for the excess water they 
consume. The net loss in consumers 1 surplus, the amount we are 
concerned with in our analysis, is therefore the area Q1 TS. This 
is correct, strictly, only if certain assumptions underlying the 
theory hold. These assumptions are detailed in the next chapter. 
The rationale for including this cost in our analysis is 
based on the fundamental principle that in carrying out a benefit-
cost Jnalysis, one should try to estimate all of the benefits and 
costs of the project in question. [34, p.344]. Due to the 
statistical problems involved in measuring consumers 1 surplus 
however, it is not unusual for analysts to ignore the concept 
altogether in their calculations. Strongly defending the 
importance of the concept, Mishan has said that 11 Without attempts 
to measure increments of consumers' surpluses, .... cost-benefit 
analyses vwuld be primitive indeed 11 • [36, p.325]. A common 
criticism may be made of the three existing studies of Hobart 
(cited above) for failing to estimate the drop in consumers' 
surplus. 
C4 Operational Costs of Producino Excess 1,~ater 
The operational costs of supplying potable 'dater consist 
mainly of the pumping and treatment costs. Water has to be pumped 
by electrical pumps and part or all of it treated with chemicals 
before it is reticulated. Obviously the higher the consumption 
level, the greater the volume of water that has to be pumped and 
chemically treated and thus the larger the operating expenses. 
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If metering were introduced, the total operational costs of 
producing water are less than they otherwise would be because of the 
reduced quantity of 'excess-water 1 delivered at a positive margina·1 
price. 
BENEFITS: 
Bl Non-installation of New Pioeline 
The latest report on the scheme to buiid a new trunkline for 
Hobart's water needs states that without meters work on the 
duplication of the Derwent Water Supply Scheme would have to 
start as early as 1978/9 [5, p.l]. ,f\.dditional investment 
expenditure wou1d be outlaid over a ten year period before the 
pipeline to Hobart is complete. This pipeline would then be 
adequate to meet the demand until sometime in the 1990's, the 
exact year depending on the forecast of future wate:zr consumption 
trend. (See Fig. 3, p. 22). 
Assuming that under metering, the consumption of water 
could be reduced, the existing capacity would be sufficient to 
meet demand for a 1 anger period of time, hence postponing the 
necessity to augment supply to a later date. The capital cost 
of installing the new pipeline would thus be saved if the 
metering project is accepted. 
B2 Non-imposition of Restrictions Before Comoletion of 
New Pipeline. 
Because the demand for water in Hobart is expected to meet the 
present supply capacity during the summer of 1978 and work on the 
proposed new pipeline is not expected to commence until 1979 due 
to the delay in obtaining loan funds, the MWB has had to plan a 
program of restrictions on the use of water to reduce the summer 
demand. The program is expected to last five years and seven 
inspectors are to be employed, whose duty would be to ensure 
that consumers do not infringe the restrictions. The annual cost 
of imposing restrictions consist of the salaries paid to the 
inspectors and other administrative and publicity expenses. Since 
the metering project itself takes about three years to complete, 
the savings on restrictions that enter our analysis correspond 
only to the latter two years before the first stage of the new 
pipeline becomes operational. 
83 Avoidance of Ooerational Costs with New Pioeline 
Under the present system of charging for water, no 
distinction is made between the basic allowance and what is 
consumed in excess of that allowance. However, referring to 
Fig. 1, we notice that the amount of excess water consumed when 
the price is reduced to zero is OT units. This situation is 
in fact no different from the present system of charging a 
flat rate for unlimited use. Hence we may speak of the 'excess 
water consumed' under the non-metering system. 
Now, as mentioned earlier, without meters, a greater 
volume of water may be expected to undergo pumping and treatment 
procedures, hence increasing the operating expenses bill. This 
negative cost constitutes another benefit of accepting the 
18. 
metering proposal instead or the new pipeline. 
2.4 Need for New Pipeline With Meters 
One of the benefits of metering mentioned in the prev1ous 
section was the costs that could be saved if investment in the 
new pipeline is delayed. Measurement of these savings therefore 
requires the determination of the time gap between building the 
pipeline now, without metering, and later, under a marginal cost 
pricing system. To do this, vJe employ a modified version of 
the model developed by Williamson [521. The modification is 
necessary because of the existence of a two-part tariff in our 
situation. By this is meant that a fixed charge is levied for 
the 1 basic allowance' of water per household above which a price 
per unit of water applies. Instead of 'total amount of water 
consumed 1 , our analysis is conducted in terms of 'total amount 
of excess water consumed'. 
Fig. 2 below illustrates the rat~onale of the model. 
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Figure 2 shows that the demand curve for excess water, 
assumed initially in the position A, graGually shifts away from 
the origin as the population and affluence of consumers increase 
each year. These factors are conveniently represented by the 
number of connections 8 in the excess annual demand function for 
water formulated for the analysis: 
Q == f (C, P, R, S) 
where Q = total excess water consumed during that year 
(in ~'1ega'litres). 
C = number of connections in that year 
P =real price of excess water (in ¢/Kilolitre, 1966/7 prices) 
R = total rainfall during the period October-February (in mm). 
S = 1, if restrictions were imposed on water consumption 
in that year 
= 0, otherwise. 
Estimation results of the above function are presented in 
Chapter 4. 
The position of the demand function in any year can thus be 
obtained by maintaining the variables C, R and S at appropriate 
values and varying the price P. 
The model also involves estimation of the short-run and 
long-run marginal costs of producing water: The short-run 
marginal costs (SRMC) are assumed to be the marginal operating 
costs of pumping and treating water. These are assumed to be 
constant, at a rate of b (¢/Kl), as long as output is less than 
8. The Rivers and Water Supply Commission [7, p.2] argues that it is 
the household rather than the person which most significantly 
incl uences demand, "because there is 1 ittle difference in drawoff 
for such matters as washing machines, car cleaning, gardening and 
lawns whether there are 3 or 4 persons in a house 11 • Furthermore 
we assume that vith grOiving affluence, the number of persons per 
household would tend to decline whilst the number of properties 
with water connections (e.g. holiday shacks) would increase. It is 
contended therefore that the number of connections is superior to 
other variables such as annual income or total population in 
explaining the consumption trend of water. 
capacity. "\~hen capacity is reached, however, marginal operating 
costs become effectively infinite. Thus a sharp kink develops ctt 
·che existing capacity level 11 • [52. p.68]. 
Because we are concerned with excess water demand a method was 
devised to provide the analogous levels at which the SRMC curve 
becomes vertical. This method requires the use of the demand 
function formulated above and Fig. 3, which shows the projected 
demand on Hobart's water supply system in summer. The two curves 
show the unrestricted demand in a dry summer (i.e. average summer 
demand plus a 10% safety margin). The 'High Estimate' and 'Low 
Estimate' curves are drawn on the basis of high and low forecasts 
respectively of the number of househJlds connected to the water 
supply system after 1978/9. (See Section 3.6 for further 
explanation). The diagram indicates that the present supply system 
will be operating at capacity in the summer of 1978/9. With a new 
pipeline, such as the one proposed as the alternative to metering, 
Hobart 1 s water supply capacity \vou1d be enhanced (broken line) and 
from the diagram we can determine that demand will equal supply 
again under the High timate in 1991/2 and under the Low Estimate 
1n 1995/6. 
We have assumed that the excess demand function will shift 
away from the origin as the number of connections increases every 
year. Assuming there are X connections9 served by the system in 
1978/9, we can estimate the 'total excess water 1 consumed in 
that year by substituting the appropriate data into the estimated 
excess-water demand function (i.e. P = 0, R = R, S = 0, C = X)1° 
21. 
9. It is estimated by the MNB that there would be 44 616 properties 
in the Hobart area by the end of '78/9 served by the present 
supply system. [5, Appendix]. 
10. Rainfall is set at the mean value for a 1 dry summer~· ~ssuming 
water authorities plan to meet peak summer demand plus an 
allowance for dry summer contingencies. See Section 4.1 for 
definition of • dry surnmer 1 • 
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This is shown in Fig. 2 by the intercept Q1 of demand curve A on 
the horizontal axis. Consequently, we assume that that in fact 
will be Hobart's position in 1978/9. 
The new pipeiine will cause the vertical section of .the 
short-run marginal cost curve to shift to the right, by say E 
units of output. The High Estimate Curve in Fig. 3 tells us that 
the new pipeline will achieve full-capacity operation in the 
summer of 1991/2. Thus the position of SRMC2 can be determined 
by substituting the values R = R, S = 0, P = 0 and the estimated 
number of connections at the end of 1991/2 for C into the 
estimated excess-water demand function. The same procedure may be 
used if the analysis is to be undertaken with a different 
assumption regarding future number of connections served (e.g. 
the Low Estimate Curve). 
The formula that has been used to express short-run marginal 
costs (b) for water is: 
1 b = 6 L: t = 1983/4, '84/5, ....... '88/9.11 
where: 6V~ = increment in operating expenses for year t, 
" 
; a \/ - V, t-1 I • ..,_. • -, t 
~Qt = increment in annual demand for year t, 
i.e. Qt- Qt-1 
The long-run marginal cost (LRMC) of supplying water is 
defined as the sum of the marginal operating costs (b) and 
the average capacity costs (s) of a fully utilized new pipeline, 
i.e. LRt·lC = b + s. sin turn comprises the average annual 
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11. The years 1983/4 - 1988/9 were chosen because the new pipeline, 
in the absence of metering, will come into operation in 1983/4 
assuming work begins in 1979/80. [5, p.1]. This formula 
therefore provides us with a 1 forward-looking 1 estimate of 
. marginal costs instead of a figure based on historical data. 
[see 44, p.lO]. 
maintenance cost of the new pipeline and the quantity f· R is 
the amount paid annually over the useful life of the pipeline by 
an equivalent risk annuity foregone as a result of investment 
in the pipeline and Z is the total capacity of the new pipeline, 
in our case 150 Ml/day. 
With the above formulation of the model, Williamson's analysis 
goes on to show that a new output unit (i.e. pipeline) should be 
added when the area IJN in Fig. 2 just exceeds the area JKL 
and not before. Suppose these two areas are equal when the 
excess-demand function is in position C. 
The basis of this optimal-capacity condition is derived from 
welfare theory. Briefly, it rests on the assumption that social 
benefit is to be maximized. This may be achieved with the aid of 
a Social Welfare function of the form: 
W = S + (TR - TC) 
where the first term is the consumers 1 surplus and the second 
term (Total Revenue minus Total Cost), the producers' net 
revenue (referred to by Williamson as 'producers 1 surplus'). 
Reverting to Fig. 2, consider the position C of the excess-
demand function. By definition, producers' surplus will be 
giver by HING and consumers' surplus by VIH. Thus, the welfare 
gain will be VING. Suppose the additional pipeline is built; 
marginal cost pricing will dictate the price P2 , causing 
producers' surplus to decrease by the amount (HING + GJLF + JKL) 
while consumers' surplus increases by (HING + GJLF + IJN). The 
net gain is IJN -JKL, which clearly is zero. Hence, from a 
welfare point of view, one is indifferent to whether capacity 
should remain at Q1 or be increased to Q1 + E. But whenever IJN > 
JKL, the net welfare gain will be positive, in which case the new 
pipeline should be added. 
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Compared with the above analysis, the existing studies 
presume that new supply units should be added whenever the 
existing system reaches the point of operating at full capacity, 
i.e. as indicated by the supply and demand projection in Fig. 3. 
Following that approach, it is contended that a pricing system, 
even if implemented, would not be made use of to the best 
advantage to society. 
It is to be noted that the analysis above holds strictly only 
under the assumption that there is a single uniform class of 
demands and indivisible output units. For an item like water, 
which experiences a periodic load demand, Williamson provides an 
extension of his model, incorporating separate periodic demand 
curves. Unavailability of essential data did not permit us to 
employ the periodic-load analysis in our study. Ho~t1ever, it is 
contended that this does not seriously alter the basic results 
of the present analysis. As Williamson points out, "the analysis 
of periodic loads differs only in degree and not in kind from 
the ..... uniform-load problemn. [52, p.82]. 
The advantage of our aoproach over the previous studies 
is not only that it shows correctly how long the deferment of 
investment in the new pipeline will be through metering, but 
also it provides us with a firm pricing policy which is 
welfare motivated. 
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CHAPTER 3 
;~SSUMPTIONS 
3.1 Consumers' Surolus 
In Section 2.3, the concept of consumers' surplus was 
depicted by the shaded area under the demand curve. Now this is 
true only under the assumption that water is a commodity with 
zero income elasticity [25, pp.193-195; 32, p.69]. Alternatively 
consumers' surplus can be represented by the area P1SR in Fig. 1 
for a good whose income elasticity is not 0, if the demand curve 
employed is the 'income-compensated' (or Hicksian) demand curve. 
The income-compensated demand curve is different from the 
'ordinary' (Marshallian) demand curve in that it excludes the 
income effect of price changes while the latter incorporates it. 
We assume that an approximation of the income-compensated 
demand curve may be obtained ~y estimating a general linear 
demand curve with income and price among the demand determinants.lZ 
We have in fact done this by including the number of connections 
in the excess-aemand for water function [Section 2.4]. As 
would be recalled increases in real income (and affluence) are 
associated with an increasing number of connections to water 
,, supplies. 
The other assumption we make in measuring consumers 1 
surplus is that the excess-demand curve for water is linear, at 
least over the relevant range of prices, represented by OP 1 in 
Fig. 2. 
12. This assumption is considered reasonable because in allowing 
for changes in real income in the demand function, we are in 
fact 11 eliminating the income effect from the price-quantity 
data 11 • [25, p.150]. 
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3.2 Demand Curve for Hobart 
A demand function for water showing the relationship betwe~n 
quartity and price is necessary for evaluating changes in 
consumers 1 surplus and forecasting when the nev-1 pipeline ought to 
be added to the system under metering (see Chapter 2). In the 
case of Hobart however, such a function is non-existent because 
of the absence of a marginal pricing system. 
One solution to the problem is to conduct a large-scale 
experiment on a sample of the population whereby the consumption 
behaviour of consumers is studied under different price regimes. 
Such an experiment was not feasible within the limits of this 
study. Besides, this method has its own serious limitations. 
For example, the sample households would be aware that the 
1 prevailing 1 price level is only temporary and this vJOuld affect 
the adjustment of their consumption pattern, producing error-
prone data. 
The other possibility, adopted here, is to employ data from 
metered areas that are comoarable to the area under study. The 
areas selected in this study \'iere the North Esk and West Tamar 
Water Supply Scheme areas in the north of Tasmania. Both 
schemes together (hereafter referred to as the 'Substitute Area') 
serve the region encompassing Georgetown and the city of 
Launceston. Time-series data revealed that climatically there 
is no significant difference between the Substitute Area and 
Hobart. In addition, we assume that any difference in terrr.s of 
standard of living, tastes and preferences of residents in the 
two areas that might affect their water demand patterns is 
negligible. Effectively, our assumption implies that Hobartians 
would behave in the same way under a price system as do the 
consumers in the Substitute Area. 
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The excess-demand function, described in the previous 
chapter, was thus estimated using pooled data from the Substitu~e 
Area and the resulting equation was applied to the present problem 
facing Hobart. (Results of estimation are presented in Section 4.3). 
3.3 Pricinq Policy under ~~eterina 
It •.vill oe recalled from Section 2.4 that the model was in 
terms of 'excess-water' consumption, with the underlying 
assumption that with metering, a 2 part tariff would be imposed 
on consumers. Marginal cost pricing would thus affect only 
what is consumed above the annual basic allowance per household. 
In line with most metered areas in Australia and even other 
countries, this pricing system is assumed likely to be implemented 
if meters are i nsta l1 ed in Hobart. A more important reason for 
employing a 2 part tariff seems to be that it ensures full 
recovery of costs by the public authority responsible for 
providing water. The minimum charge for the basic allowance is 
designed to cover the fixed costs of water supply, which are 
relatively high because of the large investment r-equired, and ·in 
addition some of the fixed operating costs (e.g. maintenance of 
treatment works, meter reading and billing). 
This study does not purport to prescribe what the basic 
allowance or minimim charge should be but a few important points are 
mentioned to serve as guidelines for formulating an optimal 
pricing policy for Hobart's water supply. Firstly, the fixed 
minimum charge ·is justified only if the short-run marginal costs are 
lower than the average costs [22, p.169]. Total expenditure would 
not be covered by charging only at the marginal price and therefore 
the fixed charge becomes necessary to raise the necessary revenue. 
When marginal costs exceed average costs, fixed capital and 
operating costs~ ·like the variable costs are reflected in the 
price charged for water and hence a fixed charge is not 
justified. It would be beneficial from the view of rationalizing 
the price structure however, to abolish the minimum anowance with 
the fixed charge and to retain the fixed charge. This would also 
allow the v1ater authority progressively to reduce the fixed 
charge, with the ultimate aim of selling all water at a marginal 
price. The economics of such a pricing policy and others are 
extensively dealt with elsewhere (see Bibliography for selected 
references). fm optimal pricing policy for Hobart could be 
developed with further work in this area. 
3.4 Comoarison of Projects vlith Different Lifetimes 
When comparing a project such as metering Hobart 1 S water 
supplies with the new pipeline alter~ative, we are faced with 
the difficulty of unequal project ~lives. With meters, the need 
to augument capacity is deferred to either 1998/9 or 2003/4 
according to whether we take the High or Low Estimate assumption 
concerning future number of connections. This result was 
determined by the technique outlined in Section 2.4. In other 
words the estimated excess demand function reaches the position C 
in Fig. 2, in either 19S9/2000 or 2004/5 (Calculations are 
shown in Chapter 4). 
On the other hand, if the new pipeline is built over the 
period 1979/80 - 1988/9, it will meet expected future demand 
only until 1991/2 or 1995/6 under the High and Low ass.umptions 
respectively, as shown by Fig. 3. Thus additional capacity 
should become operational in 1992/3 or 1996/7 if restrictions are 
to be avoided. We therefore have under each assumption a like 
?ituation of the need for further capacity expansion but that 
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situation is arrived at in different years. 
11 Where the projects being compared do not have equal 
lives, simply calcu1atino their net present values will 
not pro vi de man agernent \'/l th the inforrnati on necessary 
for it to make a decision .... 11 [38, p.ll2]. 
There are several methods of analysis which overcome the 
problem of comparing projects 'rlith unequal lives [see 38]. The 
technique we adopt in th1s study is one which calculates the 
equivalent annual cost for each proposal. Thus for the High 
Estimate assumption for example, we compare the annual equivalent 
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of the total discounted costs of metering over the period 1979/80 -
1998/9 with the annual equivalent of the total discounted (negative) 
costs of building the new pipeline from 1979/80 - 1991/2. Likewise 
for the Low Estimate consumption, we compute the annual equivalents 
over the periods 1979/80 - 2003/4 and 1979/80 - 1995/6 for the 
metering and pipeline projects respectively. The difference 
between the annual equivalents calculated as above will indicate 
whether metering is in fact a more economic proposition than 
the-non-metering proposal. 
The above method overcomes the legitimate objection of the 
r1JB to the method employed by the HCC in its calcu·iations where 
costs under the two schemes were discounted over a 20 year period 
with no regard given to the unequal lives of the projects being 
compared [4, p.2]. 
3.5 Inflation and the Discount Rate 
When measuring future costs and benefits of a project, 
account must be taken of changes in price levels over time. This 
aspect of the analysis is especially relevant when a project 
which is, say labour-intensive is being compared with a capital-
intensive project. Such in fact is the case in our study. For 
metering which involves mainly reading and billing costs after 
installation, the major component of future costs is that of 
labour. Building a new pipeline, on the other hand, requires 
large quantities of building materials and hence may be classified 
as a capital-intensive project. 
Now if the prices of materials were to rise at the same 
rate as labour wage rates, there would be no need to incorporate 
inflation explicitly into the analysis. Simply estimating the 
31. 
future costs and benefits in terms of constant prices and discounting 
them by an inflation-free discount rate would yield the correct 
results. This in fact is the assumption frequently made by analysts 
to take care of the problem of inflation. However, to do so in 
our case would be distorting the situation in reality. A survey 
of price indexes for the past 10 years for various items that 
enter the 2 projects in question reveal that their rates of 
increase have not been identical [21~ Table 1]. 
So as to reflect the relative rates of increase and not to 
bias against either project, it would be ideal to escalate all 
future costs and benefits by the appropriate rates. Discounting 
these back by an interest rate vJhi ch incorporates the expected 
change in the general price level would then give the desired 
results [46, p.8]. This method however requires accurate forecasts 
of the various rates of increase in prices. A similar method 
which yields identical results to the latter involves the use 
of constant prices for all the cost categories but adjusted 
for any relative difference in the rates of increase. Thus if 
we know from past trends the relative differencesin the rates 
inuell\st. in P"ite.<> 
of.iRflatieA for different items, we can incorporate it into the 
analysis by maintaining one of the cost items at constant prices 
(zero inflation rate) and adjusting all other future cost estimates 
for the relative margins. The appropriate discount rate to 
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use would then be the inflation-free discount rate. 
In our study there are three principal items whose prices 
have increased in the past at different rates. They are materials 
used in the construction of pipelines and meters, labour, and 
electricity to work the water pumps. By our method, we maintain 
the rate of price increase in materials at zero and adjust the 
future constant price estimates of labour and electricity charges 
upwards by 2% and downwards by 2% respectively. By doing this 
we are effectively assuming that in future labour wage levels 
will rise at a rate 2% above the rate of increase in material 
prices and the industrial price of electricity will increase at a 
rate 2% below it. This relative difference in the rates was 
obtained by inspecting the past trends in the following 3 indexes: 
(i) Wholesale Price Index of Materials Used in Building other 
than House Building. (Steel and Iron Products). 
Source: Tasmanian Year Book (various issues). 
(ii) Weighted Average Minimum Weekly Wage Rates and Index 
Numbers (31st Dec.). Adult Males (Public Authority 
(n.e.i.) and community and business services). Source: 
Tasmanian Year Book {various issues). 
(iii)The Industrial Price of Electric Power in Tasmania. 13 
Source: Tasmanian Year Book (various issues). 
Our future cost and benefit estimates were therefore adjusted 
as f o 11 ows : -
(a) Maintained at constant 07/8) prices (i.e. zero inflation rate): 
Cl: Purchase and installation of meters 
81: Non-installation of new pipeline 
13. This index was also used to convert the price of excess water 
in the North in each year of the sample period to real terms 
(1966/7 prices)· for the purpose of estimating the excess 
demand function, assuming excess water charges in the past were 
based on operating costs. the oain component of which is 
electricity to work the pumps. 
(b) Constant (1977/8) prices adjusted at a positive rate of 2%: 
C2: Reading. Billing and ~1aintenance of meters. 
82: Non-imposition of restrictions before completion of new 
pipeline. 
(c) Constant (1977/8) prices adjusted at a negative rate of 2%: 
C3: Loss of Consumers 1 surplus (assuming a marginal cost 
pricing po 1 icy is adopted for excess water under 
metering). 
C4: Operational Costs of producing excess water. 
83: Avoidance of operational costs of providing larger 
quantity of excess water. 
Having estimated all future costs and benefits in terms 
of constant 1977/8) prices, it is necessary to discount them 
back to the base year (in our case 1978/9) so that the benefits 
and costs of the project may be aggregated. Because of our 
choice of method to deal with inflation, the discount rate 
chosen for this purpose must be one which does not include the 
rate of inflation. Ideally the discount rate should reflect the 
rate of time preference of society. According to Layard, 
11 
•••• the adjusted 1 on g terrn bond rate probably gives as good 
\ 
evidence as we are likely to get on (the) risk-free time 
preference. 11 [30, p.35]. However, instead of adjusting the 
current long-term bond rate for exoected inflation, we have 
chosen to use the average interest rate on long term bonds in 
the mid-1930 1 s, assuming it gives a fairly accurate reflection 
of the true time preference rate in Australia. This was found 
to be about 3% p.a. The discount rate used in our analysis was 
thus 3%. For the purpose of sensitivity analysis the rates of 
2%, 4% and 5% were also used. 
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3.6 Sensitivity l\nalysis 
In our study, it appears that a fairly crucial assumption 
made concerns the rate at v1hi ch water consumption graNs in the 
future, or the growth in the number of connections, since we are 
linking this to the latter. The rate of growth of the number of 
connections is critical in determining the time interval before 
the construction of the new pipeline becomes necessary and thus 
influences the magnitude of savings made possible through metering. 
It also affects cost items such as the purchase and installation of 
meters, reading and billing costs and the consumers 1 surplus 
foregone. 
The number of properties that ~,;:i 11 be connected to water 
supplies over the next 10-25 years is by no means certain. Like 
population forecasts, a variety of estimates with a fairly wide 
spread exists [see 16, J\ppendix 3]. In the presence of such 
uncertainty, it is necessary to employ 11 Sensitivity analysis 11 ; 
by estimating the future benefits and costs with different rates 
of growth in the number of connections, it is possible to ascertain 
the extent to wnicn the project outcome is sensitive to differences 
in this respect. For our purpose we have conducted the analysis 
with 2 sets of growth rates for each of the 4 councils in the 
Hobart area. The first set (referred to as the •High Estimate•) 
was based as the forecast figures for the 11 Number of Tenements 11 
in the fv1WB Report on the new pipeline project [5, Appendix]. 
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The alternative regime (known as the 1 Low Estimate' assumption) 
foll Ov'JS a more conservative forecast of the growth rates. The 
rates chosen are designed to give an overall average figure which 
matches more closely the actual growth experienced by Hobart over 
the last 10 years (\vhich was about 2.1% p.a. ). The rates for 
the 4 councils under the two assumptions are as follows: 
Hiqh Estimate Low Estimate 
Hobart City Council 1. 5% 1.1% 
Glenorchy City Council 2.1% 1. 5% 
Clarence Council 2.6% 2.0% 
Kingborough Council 6.9% 6.0% 
Four counci 1 s' ann ua 1 average: 2.6% 2.1% 
Assuming that the rate of growth of the number of connections 
is influenced by the rate of population growth, then it is highly 
unlikely that the future growth rate in the number of connections 
will show a marked increase from the trend experienced in the 
recent past. An indication of this is the average population 
growth rate in Tasmania, which has been on the decline ever since 
the early 1950's and the trend is not expected to be reversed 
over the near future [see 1, p.56]. We therefore contend that the 
Low Estimate assumption is probably the more relevant one for 
decision making purposes. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE COSTS OF METERING 
Having described the cost items associated with metering Hobart 1 S 
water supplies in Chapter 2, we now proceed to quantify them. The 
excess-demand-for-water function formulated in Section 2.4 was 
necessary for estimating certain costs that follow. It was also 
required to deter~ine when, under the metering proposal, the new 
pipeline would have to be built. In Section 4.1 therefore we 
present the estimated equation and explain how it was adopted to 
perform the ~Jilliamson analysis [52]. This is followed by the 
cost estimates of metering. 
4.1 Demand for Excess Water in Hobart 
The equation expressing the demand for excess water was 
estimated by OLS using annual data from the Substitute Area. 
list of the data can be found in Appendix 3. Since our Substitute 
Area comprises 2 adjoining regions, tl1e data for these areas was 
pooled for the regression. The results of the estimation are as 
follows: 14 
Q ~ 790.698 + 0.016C 40.558P 0.813R - 262.217S 
(2. 975) (0. 366) (-0.761) ( -1.942) ( -1. 882) ,, 
where the variables are as defined on page 20. 
'R2 = o.35 OW Statistic = 1.52 F-Test = 4.12 
The t-ratios (shown in brackets below the coefficients) 
indicated that the constant, rainfall and restrictions were 
significant. 15 The generally low R2 and t-ratio values were due 
14. The function was also estimated with Average Maximum Summer 
Temperature included among the var·iables. It was however 
inferior to the one presented. 
15. Unless otherwise stated, all tests for significance were 
conducted at the 5% level. 
likely to the high level of correlation between the number of 
connections variable and reai price. This was confirmed when 
another regression, without those 2 variables, indicated improved 
values for R2 and the t-ratios of the remaining variables. For 
this reason, the number of connections and real-price were retained 
in the equation. 16 The Durbin-Watson statistic was in the 
inconclusive regionl 7 but inspection of the autocorrelation 
function confirmed the absence of autocorrelation. 
The average rainfall in Hobart for the period October to 
February is 268mm [6]. Based on the rainfall figure for the 
same period in a moderately dry year (1973/4, 6% below average) 
we define a 'dry 1 summer to be one \'there rainfall over the Oct.-
Feb. period is 10% below average, i.e. 241mm. Assuming that the 
MWB should plan future water supplies according to higher-than-
average summer demand, the dry summer' rainfall value was 
substituted into the estimated equation above to obtain the 
'operational' excess-demand equation. As we are now using the 
equation for Hobart, the dummy variableS can be maintained 
throughout the period of analysis at 0. 
The operational excess-demand equation thus becomes: 
Q = 594.837 + 0.016 C - 40.558 P. 
(j 
Thus for any particular year, the position of the excess demand 
curve can be determined by setting C at the appropriate value 
and plotting P against Q. 
To complete the model outlined in Section 2.4, we need the 
short-run and long-run marginal cost values. These were 
calculated using the formulae on page 23. Forecasts of operating 
37. 
16. Also, because the underlying reasoning of the demand function 
indicates that these variables be included, their exclusion 
could possibly lead to misspecification error, the consequences 
of which are severe [32, p.l6]. 
17. See Kmenta [30] for tests for autocorrelation. 
costs and maintenance expenditure for the period 1983/4 - 1988/9 
•t~ere obtained from the ~~~B report [5, Appendix].l8 The calculated 
SRMCs for each year in the period are shown in Table 1 (in 1977/8 
prices). 
TABLE 2: SHORT RUN MARGINAL COST OF PRODUCING WATER 
Year SRMC (c/Kl)\ Hence, b - 1 t;Vt 
- 6 l:zcr-
t 
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1983/4 9.083 8.45 ¢/Kl ( '77/8 prices) ::: 
84/5 8. 420 4.08 ¢/Kl ('66/7 prices) ::: 
85/6 8.373 
86/7 8. 321 
87/8 8. 2 72 
88/9 8. 221 
The average capacity costs (B) of a fully utilized pipeline 
R 
equal average annual rnaintenance cost plus L' v1here Rand Z are 
as defined on page 23. The average annual maintenance cost per 
unit of water produced was estimatea by calculating the average 
11 Administration & Engineering 11 costs found in the MWB report 
[5, Appendix] for the period 1982/3- 1985/6 an~ extrapolating 
it to the year 1993/4 when it is assumed that the new pipeline will 
be operating either at or close to full capacity. This was found 
to be 2.75 ¢/Kl (in 1 77/8 prices). Calculation of R was based on 
the assumptions that the effective lifetime of the new pipeline is 
about 15 years (i.e. before additional capacity becomes necessary) 
and that the foregone alternative is a purchase of long-term 
18. The figures in the report were lagged 1 year because of our 
assumption that v1ork on the new p·ipeline will begin in 1979/80 
and not 1978/9. 
semi-governmental bonds with an annual yield of 9.5~~ (this 
figure was the average yield as at November 1978 for several local 
semi-governmental bodies, e.g. Telecoms,HEC). 
-1 Therefore R = 30 300 000 ATSl 0• 095 = $ 3 870 634 
where $30.3m is the estimated capital cost (1977/8 prices) of the 
new p i p e 1 i n e [ 5 ] • 
R 3 870 634 
Hence I = 150 000 x 365 
= 7.07 ¢/Kl. 
(daily capacity of new pipeline 
= 150Ml). 
Consequently, 6 = 2.75 + 7.07 
Hence, LRMC 
= 9.82 ¢/Kl ('77/8 prices) 
= 4.73 ¢/Kl ('66/7 prices) 
= b + 6 
= (4.08 + 4. 73) 
= 8.81 ¢/Kl ('66/7 prices). 
The levels of excess-water consumption at which the present 
supply and the augmented supply reach full capacity (i.e. Q1 and 
Q1+E in Fig. 2) were found, using the operationai equation, to 
be 1313.15 r11 and 1585.74 Hl respectively. f~mount consumed at 
point J in Fig. 2 is therefore 1449.45 Ml. With the above data, 
simple manipulation of the operational equation showed that the 
excess demand curve will pass through the critical point J in 
either 1999/2000 (High Estimate) or 2004/5 (Low Estimate). Under 
metering ther~fore the new pipeline becomes necessary only in those 
years. The periods of analysis for the metering scheme under the 
•High' and 'Low 1 assumptions are therefore 1979/80 - 1998/9 and 
1979/80 - 2003/4 respectively. 
4.2 The Cost of Purchasing and Installing Meters : Cl 
39. 
The cost of installing a meter in a Hobart household (including 
the price of the meter) was assumed to be $61.86¢ ('77/8 prices). 
This was in fact the cost experienced in the metered Substitute 
Area of our study. Assuming full metering will be achieved in 
40. 
3 years, the costs to be incurred over the period of analysis under each 
of the two assumptions are shown in Appendixes 5A and 5B. It should 
be noted that we have only considered household meters in our study. 
We retain the MWB's assumption regarding industrial and high-
usage commercial properties that they are "either already metered 
or will be charged an economic meter rent when installations are 
made". [3, p.7]. Figures are only shown for the 3% and 5% 
discount rates. Results for the 2% and 47~ discount rates are 
included in the Appendix. We note also that since the average 
life of a meter is about 20 years [48, p.228; 8, p.13], mass 
replacement of meters ~~ould have to begin in the year 2000/1. 
Cost of these replacements is included under the low Estimate 
Assumption. 
The total discounted costs in ttlis category are (in '77/8 
prices): 
Hi g h Estimate 
Low Estimate 
"0/ 
_) iO 
$3 931 149 
5 333 629 
3 594 100 
4 435 396 
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4.3 The Costs of Readina, ~)illina and rv1aintainina Heters: C2 
The existing studies on metering in Hobart have all computed 
these costs by multiplying the number of meters in a particular year 
by an average cost per meter figure. This average cost figure covers 
such diverse costs as v1ages paid to employees and office rent. It 
is believed that in doing so, the studies have wrongly assumed that 
all costs in this category are variab'le, i.e. vary directly in 
proportion to the number of meters in existence. Clearly such 
expenses as office equipment and office rent will remain 
independent of the actual number of meters over a span of 25 years. 
We have therefore distinguished between the fixed costs (i.e. 
those costs which can be assumed to be independent of.the actual 
number of meters) and variable costs. 
The cost estimates were obtained by coilating the information 
·in the existing studies. ~·ie have assumed, as did the ~1AB in its 
submission [3] that meter reading, billing and maintenance work 
for all councils would be carried OLt from a centralized office. 
The fixed and variable costs are detailed below (in ' 7 7'P. or1'cr:>sl· I I _J l . - I ' 
A. Fl XED COSTS 
1. Labour .;;;;..;._-~ 
~~nter 1 meter supervisor (50%) 
Maintenance: 
Meter 
Reading: 
Customer 
Billing: 
1 Leading-hand fitter 
1 Shop"fitter 
1 Field fitter 
1 Tester 
1 Supervisor (50%) 
Meter Readers (2 in 
1979/80, 5 thereafter) 
1 Clerk in charge 
2 Clerks 
1 Cashier 
1 Typist/Telephonist 
20% Labour Overheads 
I 
Annua 11 v 
1979/80 after '79~80 
$ 
6 000 
11 000 
9 000 
9 000 
8 000 
6 000 
18 000 
12 000 
10 000 
11 000 
7 500 
23 500 
$ 
6 000 
11 000 
9 000 
9 000 
8 000 
6 000 
45 000 
12 000 
20 000 
11 000 
7 500 
28 900 
(Cont •.• ) 
42 . 
. Annua 11 y 
19 79/80 ,1'\.fte r '79/80 
2. Administrative $ $ 
Telephone, Power, Light, Machine 
Main ten an ce etc. 4 000 4 000 
Accommodation (Rent) @ $60 per 
square metre 7 200 7 200 
Computing Cost (+ office equipment 
in 1979/80) 26 000 16 000 
TOTAL FIXED COSTS: 168 200 200 600 
B. VARIABLE COSTS 
Transport 6¢1 
Stdti one ry 15¢ total variable cost 
Postage 20¢ per meter = 71¢ 
Ma·i n ten an ce materia 1 s: 30¢ 
The total discounted costs under this category are (in '77/8 dollars): 
30/ /0 5% 
High Estimate $4 396 058 $3 616 899 
Low Estimate 5 351 208 4 201 980 
The annual figures are shown in Appendixes 6A and 68. 
4.4 The Cost of Consumers' Surplus Foregone: C3 
The consumers' surplus for any given year is calculated by 
measuri·ng the area under the excess-:demand curve extending 
between the quantity levels demanded by consumers under metering 
and non-metering respectively. The meaning of this should be clear 
if we demonstrate the calculation of the loss in consumers' 
surplus for say 1993/4 under the 'High Estimate' assumption. 
Fig. 4 shows the position of the excess demand curve in 
1993/4. From the operational equation, we determine that a price 
of 8.06¢/Kl ( '66/7 prices) must be charged in 1993/4 to keep 
demand down at present capacity level (i.e. Hobart will be on 
I 
b+fi=8. 81 
8.06 
b .. 4.08 
43. 
FIGURE 4. Consu~;ers 1 Surnlus Forescone tn 1993/4 
LRMC 
0 L-·-------------~------------Q (E~) Ql Q2 Q3 
1313.15 1639.90 
point S on the excess demand curve). On the other hand if the non-
metering proposal was continued, a total of 1639.9Ml of •excess 
water' would have been consumed (assuming that capacity is expanded 
after 1991/2 when present supply meets demand at full capacity). 
The loss in consumers' surplus can thus be measured by the area 
enclosed in the figure Q1SQ 3 • This is given by: 
i X ( OQ 3 - OQ 1) X ( SQ d 
= $[~ (326 750) (0.0806)] 
= $13 168 ('66/7 prices) 
= $27 310 ('77/8 prices). 
The total discounted values of the loss in consumers' surplus are 
(in '77/8 prices): 
High Estimate 
Low Estimate 
3% 
$185 325 $142 703 
195 814 144 061 
Annua 1 figures are shown in Apendi xes 7A and 7B. 
4.5 The Operational Co~ts of Producing Excess \·later: C4 
If meters are installed, the operational costs of producing 
excess water should remain steady (in real terms) once consumption 
reaches present supply capacity (Q 1 in Fig. 4). The marginal 
4 4. 
cost of producing a kilolitre of water is 4.08~; the real total cost 
of producing excess water under metering over the period when the 
present sys tern is fully uti 1 i zed is therefore 
$(1 313 150 X 0.0408) =$53 577 ('66/7$) 
=$111 118 ('77/8$) 
Up to the year when the new pipeline will be needed under 
the metering proposal, the annual discounted operational costs are 
as shown in Appendixes SA and 8B. vie have assumed in our 
calculations of operational costs that all water supplied to 
consumers vii 11 be treated although it is realised that under 
present circumstances a fr·action of the reticulated \1/ater is 
untreated (especially in summer when the demand places a strain 
on the available treatment works). This assumption is in line 
with the ~IWB's stated policy that it aims to treat all supplied 
~vater, as development of ~acilHies proceeds [5, p.6]. 
The total discounted costs in this category are (in 1 77/8 
prices): 
High Estimate 
Low Estimate 
3% 5% 
$1 303 931 $1 101 049 
1 464 826 1 201 107 
\} 
CHAPTER 5 
THE BENEFITS OF METERING 
The benefits of introducing water metering to Hobart stem from 
the belief that a marginal cost pricing system will optimize the 
usage of water and defer or even avoid some of the expenses that 
waul d have to be incurred otherwise. In this chapter we quantify 
these benefits. Annual figures for 81 and 83 are shown in the 
Appendixes. 
5.1 The Non-Installation of the New Pioeline: Bl 
We have assumed in our analysis that capital funds for either 
the metering or the pipeline project will not be forthcoming until 
1979/80. The new pipeline programme, to be completed in 2 stages, 
could be spread over 10 years 11 to take into account the Board's 
capacity for raising loan funds 11 • [5, p.8]. A copy of the table 
showing the construction and financial programme (in 1977/8 prices) 
if bu'ilding work on the pipeline begins in 1979/80 is given below. 
The first stage, taking out five years, would be sufficient to 
alleviate any acute shortage of supply. 
TABLE 3 
Construction and Financiai Programme for New Pipeline 
Head Works 
Bryn Es tyn 
Treatment Works 
Pipeline to 
Glen orchy 
I 
Booster Pump 
Elwi ck 
Pipelines: 
a) Clarence 
b} Lower Res. 
Glenorchy 
c) Domain 
d) Lower Res. 
Hobart 
TOTAL: 
I 
(figures in $m) (Source: [5,p.l01) 
' I ' 
1979/80 80/1 81/2 82/3 83/4 84/5185/6 86/7 87/8188/9 
I 
1.0 0.7 
1.0 1.0 
' 
3.0 3.0 3.8 3.5 3.0 
0.3 
1.0 0.6 
0.8 
3.0 1.8 
1.211.6 
3.0 3.0 3.8 4.5 4.01 2.0 2.41 3.0 3.011.61 
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The discounted values of the capital costs above are as follmvs: 
High Estimate 
Low Es ti mate 
3% 
$27 292 722 
27 192 722 
5% 
$24 701 244 
24 701 244 
These costs, because they would not be incurred if the 
metering proposal is accepted, therefore constitute a benefit of 
metering. 
5.2 The Non-Imposition of Restrictions Prior to Completion of New 
Pipeline: 82 
As was mentioned in the last Chapter, a five year installation 
lag exists before the first stage of the new pipeline becomes 
operational. The metering project on the other hand has an 
installation lag of about 3 years. Thus, Hobart would have to 
experience water res tri cti ons for two more years than would be 
necessary under metering. 
The cost of imposing water restrictions comprise mainly the 
wages paid to inspectors employed during the period of restrictions. 
As far as consumers 1 surplus ·is concerned, there would be no loss 
as a result of restrictions. This is because 1 restrictions 1 (perhaps 
a misnomer) are designed to ensure that demand does not exceed 
supply, causing an uneven flow of water to consumers at the expense 
of connections situated on higher elevations. Thus, even without 
restrictions, the total quantity of water demanded by all consumers 
would still be the same (i.e. present capacity level). What costs 
restrictions do perhaps impose on consumers, while they are in 
force, and which can be avoided by metering are the inconvenience 
or the health dangers mentioned in Chapter 1 of this study (page 9). 
However. for the purpose of our study these costs were deemed non-
quantifiable. It is argued that the exclusion of these costs from 
the analys·is does not constitute a serious error because of the 
short space of time any particular zone in Hobart will be under 
restrictions each day. Furthermore consumers could minimize these 
effects of restrictions by 'stocking-up' water in their premises 
whiTe restrictions are relaxed. 
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The MltJB estimates that about seven inspectors would have to be 
employed at a total cost of $21 000 each year. The total benefits 
of restrictions not imposed under metering in the years 1982/3 and 1983/4 
are: High/Low Estimate 
1982/3 1983/4 T ota 1 
Constant benefits (1977/8 prices) $21 000 $21 000 
Adjusted benefits ( +2%) 23 186 23 649 
Discounted benefits: 3')/ /0 20 601 20 400 $41 001 
(Base: 19 78/9) 5% 19 075 18 530 $37 605 
5.3 Avoidance of Ooerati onal Costs with New Pipeline: 83 
Follow·ing the method used to compute the operational costs of 
producing excess water under the metering scheme, the operational 
costs that would have been incurred with the pipeline project (and 
hence saved through metering) were calculated. These costs extend 
over the period 1979/80- 1991/2 under the High Estimate assumption 
and over the period 1979/80 - 1995/6 under the Low Estimate 
Assumption. 
Thus for example in 1990/1, under the High Estimate assumption, 
the operational equation tells us that with a marginal price of 
zero for excess water, a total of [594.8374 + 0.0161 (59957)] = 
1.560 150 Kl of excess water will be consumed.l9 Now, the marginal 
operating cost per kilolitre of water produced is 8.46 ¢/Kl ('77/8 
prices). Thus the operational cost saved in 1990/1 under the 
19. According to the High Estimate, there will be a total of 59,957 
connections in Hobart in 1990/1; i.e. C = 59957. 
v 
metering proposal will be $(1 560 150 x 0.0846) = $131 989 
The total discounted savings made in this category under 
metering are thus (in '77/8 prices). 
High Estimate 
Low Estimate 
3% 
$1 096 030 
1 318 074 
$ 967 652 
1 131 850 
CHAPTER 6 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
We recall from Chapter 1 the objectives of this study: 
to examine the present approach to investment decisions of the 
water supply authority in Hobart, 
(ii) to evaluate the comparative efficiency of a marginal cost 
pricing system vis-a-vis the 'requirements' approach, and 
(iii) to assess the economic feasibility of introducing a payment-
for-use system in Hobart through the means of metering water 
supplies. 
With regard to (i), we argued that the requirements approach to 
planni~g future water supplies together with the fixed rating system 
used by Hobart has severe 1 imitations. It invariably leads to 
wasteful consumption of an economic good (water) and could readily 
lead to the construction of needlessly large water supply systems. 
It also disregards the price variable as a factor determining the 
quantity of water demanded. Implicit in the decision to expand 
capacity is the assumption that the benefit derived by the community 
from the new capacity will always exceed the costs of the extra 
capacity r1C'l ~ 11 L J.;;J ' f..! • J. J • In the present economic context therefore, 
where capital funds have to be rationed among alternative uses, the 
requ~rements approach can best be described as obsolete. 
To achieve a more efficient allocation of the State•s resources 
(assuming it is a desirable objective), it is necessary that the 
supply of water be governed by some opportunity cost principles. A 
marginal cost pricing system for water would provide a firm set of 
criteria that reflects the social opportunity cost of supplying 
water. These criteria, coupled with a Social Welfare function (such 
as the one incorporated in Williamson's model) would ensure that 
investment in supply expansion does not occur prematurely. Therefore 
with regard to the second objective above, we contend that the 
TABLE 4 
Results of Cost-Benefit Analysis (base 1978/9) 
Benefits I Costs High Estimate ($) Low Estimate ($) 
(a) For the 3% rate of dis count 
Costs: C1 -meter installation 
C2 -meter running costs 
C3 -consumers' surplus 
' C4 -operation a 1 costs 
3 931 149 
4 396 058 
185 325 
1 303 931 
9 816 463 
Annual Equivalent: 636 814 
Benefits: B 1 -pipe 1 i ne deferred 27 192 722 
B2 -restrictions avoided 41 001 
83 -operational (negative) 
costs 1 096 030 
Annual Equivalent: 
(b) For the 5% rate of discount 
Costs: C1 -meter installation 
C2 -meter running costs 
C3 -consumers' surplus 
C4 -operational costs 
28 329 753 
2 507 920 
3 594 100 
3 616 899 
142 703 
1 101 049 
8 454 751 
Annual Equivalent: 659 437 
Benefits: 81 -pipeline deferred 24 701 244 
B2 -restrictions avoided 37 605 
costs 
83 -operational (negative) 
costs 967 652 
25 706 501 
Annual Equivalent: 2 596 974 
5 333 629 
5 351 208 
195 814 
1 464 826 
12 345 477 
690 581 
27 192 722 
41 001 
1 318 074 
28 551 797 
2 075 973 
4 435 396 
4 201 980 
144 061 
1 201 107 
9 982 544 
694 426 
24 701 244 
37 605 
-
1 131 850 
25 870 699 
2 213 135 
.,., 
<' 
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price variable, if made use of according to marginal cost pricing rules, 
is superior to the requirements approach. 
To assess whether or not a payment-for-use system is an economic 
proposition (objective (iii) above), we utilised the cost-benefit 
tool. Results of the cost-benefit analysis are presented in Table 4. 
Comparison of the annual equivalents under both the High and Low 
Estimates indicates that the benefits of metering exceed the costs by 
a very clear margin. (Results for the 2% and 4% discount rates are 
similar; see Appendix 9). We therefore conclude that metering Hobart's 
watersupplies and implementing a marginal cost pricing policy are in 
fact more beneficial than building a new pipeline under the present 
flat-rate method of charging. 
The importance of having an optimal pricing policy for the 
efficient management of demand cannot be over-emphasized. 
11 While universal metering is a prerequisite to the introduction 
of an effective water price policy~ the installation of meters 
per se does not guarantee an efficient use of water. This goes 
to say that if a water authority seeks a successful water control 
policy it should look to rneterin~J of water supplies coupled VJith 
an effective water orice policy." [19, p.78, emphasis added]. 
It is plausible to have a metered situation which in fact creates 
a disincentive for the efficient use of water. This is true, for 
example, if the basic aiimvance given per household is so large that 
consumers are actually encouraged to use at least a •minimum' 
quantity of water. 
The analysis in this study is however not without its limitations. 
It must be borne in mind that the dependability of the results ultimately 
rests on the assumptions underlying the analysis. Our assumption that 
there would be no significant difference between the demand behaviour 
of consumers in the Substitute Area and Hobart under a pricing scheme 
is but a hypothesis that cannot be proven a priori. Based on 
geographical and cl irnati c factors at least, the assumption seems 
reasonable. We have not included in our analysis the 'political 
cost' of implementing a pricing policy for water in Hobart. 
Obviously to introduce any sort of rationing system would be an 
unpopular proposition in the eyes of the public and metering is no 
exception. The political factor is an extremely subjective one 
and hence extremely difficult to accurately quantify. We believe 
however that metering could be made less objectionable to the 
public through proper education. The public needs to be made aware 
that water can no longer be regarded as a •free good' ,and that its 
supply has to be governed by principles which also apply to other 
essentials, like electricity. In this way the 'political cost 1 
attached to the metering alternative could be minimized or even 
avoided. 
As of November 1978, it appears that vJith the States' 
successful procurement of the right to make overseas• ioans, the 
government is bent on proceeding with the pipeline project. It 
may perhaps be too late to change that decision but it is hoped 
that the present study will serve to indicate the type of analysis 
that could assist in making the optimal decision when faced with a 
similar situation in future. 
50. 
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APPENDIX 1 
CONSUt~PTION PER CONNECTION - LITRES PER DAY (ANNUAL AVERAGE) 
Hobart Me tropo 1 i tan Area 
West Tamar 
North Esk (A 11 
Municipalities) 
Source: [ 7] 
1970/1 
695 
498 
410 
APPENDIX 2 
I 71/2 I 72/73 
735 863 
484 591 
390 405 
' 
'73/41 '74/5 
I 
'75/6 
819 820 793 
535 525 I 535 
318 3361 395 
Bl: CAPITAL COST OF THE NEW PIPELINE SAVED (High/Lmv Estimates) 
(All figures in 1977/8 Dollars) 
fS5. 
I Year j Constant 
t 1979/80 : 
I Discounted 
1 j at 2% 3% 4% 5% 
3 000 000 
80/1 3 000 000 
81/2 3 800 000 
' I 82/3 I 4 500 000 I I I 83/4 4 000 000 I 
84/5 2 000 000 
85/b 2 400 000 
86/7 3 000 000 
87/8 3 000 000 
88/9 3 000 000 
TOTALS: 
I I 
2 941 176 I 
2 883 506 
I 3 580 825 
I I 4 157 304 
3 622 923 
1 775 934 
2 089 344 
2 560 471 
2 510 266 
2 461 045 
$28 582 794 
I 
I 
2 912 621 
2 827 7871 
3 477 538 
I 3 998 192 I 
3 450 435 I 
1 674 969 
1 951 420 
2 368 228 
2 299 250 
2 232 282 
27 192 722 
2 884 615 
2 773 669 
3 378 186 
3 846 619 
3 287 708 
1 580 629 
1 823 803 
2 192 071 
2 107 760 
2 026 693 
25 901 753 
i 
2 857 140 i 
I 
2 121 ogo I 
3 282 592 I 
i 
3 702 150 
3 134 120 
1 492 440 
1 705 632 
2 030 520 
1 933 830 
1 841 73o I 
24 701 244 
56. 
APPENDIX 3 
DATA USED IN THE ESTH1ATION OF EXCESS-WATER DEMAND FUNCTION 
Year Qty. (Ml) 
West 1968/9 152.278 0 
Tamar: 
North 
Esk: 
69!70 306.906 6 
70/1 283.159 8 
71/2 253.162 1 
72/3 675.955 2 
73/4 481.449 8 
74/5 450.915 0 
75/6 1 503. 875 a 
I 
76/7 ! 320.956 4 
77/8 650.850 0 
I 
I 1964/5 I 92.103 o 
1 65/6 1359.430 5 
I 66/7 !743. 6os s 
I 67/8 1508.287 5 
I 68/9 r 188.841 o 
I 69/70 1542.655 o 
70/1 
71/2 
72/3 
73/4 I 
74/5 
75/6 
76/7 
77/8 
336.753 0 
202.751 5 
328.472 5 
0 
0 
307.510 0 
158.831 0 
39.148 0 
Real Price 
(¢/Kl) 
4. 211 
4.147 
4.029 
3. 780 
3.658 
3.429 
4.021 
4.681 
4. 711 
6.375 
5.635 
5.578 
5.500 
5.345 
5.263 
5.184 
5.037 
4.725 
5.486 
5.456 
6.032 
7.022 
7 495 
8.000 
. I Ra i n fa 1 l : Connect1ons (mm) Restrictions 
2 980 
3 066 
3 178 
3 371 
3 712 
3 818 
3 921 
4 031 
4 222 
4 339 
5 582 
5 941 
6 171 
6 475 
6 626 
7 002 
7 242 
7 651 
7 915 
8 276 
8 561 
8 786 
9 343 
9 787 
483 
251 
313 
471 
218 
364 
296 
355 
307 
I 258 
156 
131 
154 
171 
I
I 393 
223 
303 
370 
147 
275 
271 
264 
297 
209 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
., 
. J 
APPENDIX 4A 
83: THE OPERATIONAL COSTS OF PRODUCING EXCESS-WATER \11TH NEt1 
PIPELINE.SAVED (HIGH ESTIMATE) 
57. 
All Figures in 1977/8 Dollars. Base Year for Discounting: 1978/9. 
Constant Adjusted lo; s counted 3% 4% I 5% (-2%) zo; /0 
1979/80 111 118 106 803 104 709 103 692 102 6951101 717 
80/1 111 118 104 709 100 643 98 699 96 810 I 94 974 
81/2 111 118 102 656 96 735 83 945 91 261 I 88 678 
82/3 111 118 100 643 92 979 89 420 s6 o3o I 82 799 
83/4 111 118 98 669 89 367 85 113 81 099 77 310 
84/5 120 518 104 918 93 164 87 867 82 918 78 292 
I 
85/6 122 273 104 359 90 851 84 853 79 304 74 166 
! 86/7 124 088 103 832 88 620 81 966 I 75 869 70 278 
I I I 87/8 125 965 103 335 86 467 79 198 I 72 602 66 611 
88/9 127 866 102 838 84 363 76 521 69 473 63 133 
89/90 129 879 102 408 82 363 73 982 66 522 59 876 
! 90/1 131 989 102 015 80 438 71 551 63 719 55 907 
I I 91/2 134 133 101 65 7 78 584 I 69 223 61 052 53 911 
TOTALS: $1 169 283 1 096 o3oJ 1 ozg 354)967 652 I 
APPENDIX ilB 
83: THE OPERATIONAL COSTS OF PRODUCli'JG EXCESS-WATER WITH NEW 
PIPELINE SAVED (LOW ESTIMATE) 
58. 
All Figures in 1977/8 dollars. Base Year for Discounting: 1978/9 
Constant Adjusted Discounted, I ( -2~{) 2% 3% 4% 5% 
1979/80 111 092 106 778 104 684 103 668 102 671 101 693 
80/1 111 092 104 684 100 619 98 674 96 786 94 951 
81/2 111 092 102 632 96 712 93 922 91 239 88 657 
82/3 111 092 100 619 92 956 89 398 86 010 82 780 
I I 83/4 111 092 98 646 89 347 85 093 81 080 77 292 I 
I 84/5 118 033 102 755 91 243 86 055 81 209 76 677 
85/6 119 361 101 873 l 88 687 82 832 77 415 72 399 
\ 
86/7 120 729 101 021 I 86 220 79 747 73 815 68 375 
I I 
I 
87/8 122 136 I 100 194 I 83 838 76 790 I 70 395 64 586 I 
I 
88/9 123 588 99 397 I 81 540 73 96o I 67 149 61 021 
I i I I 71 250 1 I I 
I 
I 89/90 125 083 98 627 I 79 322 64 066 57 665 I I 
I 90/1 126 623 97 883 77 180 68 653 61 137 54 505 
I I 
l 91/2 128 215 I 97 172 75 117 66 169 58 359 s1 532 1 I ! I I 92/3 129 854 ! 96 483 73 122 63 786 55 717 48 73o I l I 
I 
i I 
93/4 1131 548 I 95 826 71 200 61 507 53 209 46 o94 I I 
94/5 133 299 95 197 69 346 59 324 50 826 43 611 
95/6 135 137 94 618 67 573 57 246 48 574 41 282 
TOTALS: $ 1 428 706 1 318 074 1 219 657 1 131 850 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Year 
1979/80 
80/l 
81/2 
82/31 
83/4 
84/5 
85/6 
86/7 
87/8 
88/9 
89/90 
90/l 
91/2 
92/3 
93/4 
94/5 
95/6 
96/7 
97/8 
98/9 
99/2000 
2000/1 
2001/2 
2002/3 
2003/4 
TOTAL: 
59. 
APPENDIX SA 
Purchase and Installation Costs 
(All figures in 1977/8 Dollars) 
No. of Meters Discounted Annual Costs (Base 1 78/9) Installed 
I 
High Low High Estimate Low Estimate 
,Estimate Estimate 3% ($) 5% ($) 3% ($)I 5% ( $) 
I I 
! 
I 
I 
I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
' 
I 
I 
l 
16 000 
16 000 
15 904 
1 130 
1 203 
1 245 
1 288 
1 332 
~ 
1 430 
1 479 
1 534 
1 590 
1 651 
1 713 
2 320 
1 308 
1 922 
1 999 
2080 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
16 000 
16 000 
14 944 
897 
922 
948 
975 
1 005 
1 033 
1 066 
1 097 
1 131 
1 169 
1 203 
1 244 
1 285 
1 327 
I 
I 
I 
1 372 1 
1 418 
1 466 
1 519 
1 573 
1 629 
1 689 
1 750 
960 932 
932 944 
900 336 
62 107 
64 194 
64 5001 
I 
64 784 
65 046 
65 3321 
65 8231 
66 095\ 
66 5561 
66 976, 
67 5211 
! 
68 0161 
89 343 
48 959 
I 
69 8381 
70 5201 
71 241 
942 628 
897 742 
849 864 
57 508 
58 309 
57 471 
56 624 
55 770 
54 948 
54 306 
53 493 
52 840 
52 161 
51 583 
50 972 
65 746 
35 302 
49 403 
48 935 
48 494 
460 9321 
9 32 944! 
I 
845 9871 
I 
49 300i 
I 
49 1991 
49 1121 
l 
49 041, 
I 
44 077/ 
l 
48 975: 
49 0681 
! 
49 023 
49 071 
49 242/ 
I 
49 1991 
! 
49 3941 
i 
I 
49 535! 
49 6651 
I 
49 854 
50 024 
50 211 
50 511 
567 334 
552 565 
506 161 
78 205 
942 628 
89 7 7 42 
79 8 56 3 
45 650 
44 688 
43 760 
42 864 
42 078 
41 191 
40 483 
39 676 
38 959 
38 350 
37 586 
37 016 
36 415 
35 815 
35 266 
34 713 
34 179 
33 728 
371 613 
355 045 
319 034 
48 354 
p 931 149 s 59 4 100 is 333 629~ 435 396 I 
60. 
APPENDIX 58 
Cl: PURCHASE AND INSTALLATION COST 0 F METERS 
All Figures in 1977/8 dollars. Base Year for Discounting: 1978/9 
High Estimate Low Es ti rna te 
Year Discounted 
2% 4% 2% 4% 
1979/80 970 353 951 692 970 353 951 692 
80/1 951 326 915 089 951 326 915 089 
81/2 927 077 874 613 871 117 821 820 
82/3 64 579 59 753 60 062 47 431 
83/4 67 403 61 166 51 658 46 879 
84/5 68 388 60 867 52 073 46 346 
85/6 69 363 60 547 
I 
52 507 45 834 
I I 
I 
86/7 70 326 60 207 53 061 45 426 
87/8 71 328 I 59 891 I 53 469 44 896 I I 
:) i 0 I 88/9 72 568 1 rg 760 54 09"" 114 549 
I 89/90 I 73 583 59 431 I 54 577 44 081 j 
I I 90/1 74 822 59 270 55 166 43 699 I 91/2 76 033 59 071 55 901 I 43 430 
I I I 
I 
92/3 77 403 58 978 56 400 42 975 
93/4 78 734 58 839 I 57 178 42 730 I i I I 94/5 104 543 76 623 I 57 904 I 42 440 I i I I I l 95/6 
I 
57 785 41 539 58 624 42 142 I I I I I f"'C/"7 ()'"J 1'1/IL !":'("} Cf"'r""'\ 59 424 I 41 895 I ::JUfl 0.) t::.'t:.J :.JO O::IU I 97/8 84 883 58 693 60 212 41 634 
98/9 86 591 58 723 61 030 41 388 
99/2000 61 996 41 235 
2000/1 703 157 458 698 
01/2 691 566 442 462 
02/3 639 700 401 407 
03/4 99 806 61 423 I 
TOTALS: $ 3 946 499 3 604 329 5 942 363 4 841 601 
61. 
APPENDIX SA 
C2: READING, BILLING AND ~~AINTENANCE CO~_TS (HIGH ESTiiV1ATE) 
All Fi~1ures in 1977/8 Dollars. Base Year for Discounting: 1978/9. 
Year Constant Adjusted Discounted zo; 2% 3% 4% 5% /0 
1979/80 179 560 186 814 183 151 181 373 179 629 177 918 
80/1 223 320 236 989 227 786 223 385 219 110 214 956 
81/2 234 680 254 025 239 373 232 469 225 827 
I 
219 437 
82/3 235 438 259 943 240 147 230 956 222 200 I 213 855 l I 83/4 236 292 266 103 241 018 229 543 218 717 208 500 
I I 84/5 237 172 I 272 441 I 241 920 228 165 215 314 203 301 I 
I 
85/6 238 091 I 278 962 242 853 226 822 211 988 198 253 
l 86/7 239 037 I 285 671 243 817 I 225 511 208 737 193 354 I I I 87/8 240 015 I 292 577 244 815 I 224 236 205 561 188 598 I 
I 
I 
I ' I 
I 88/9 241 030 299 691 245 851 I 222 998 202 461 I 183 983 I I I I I 89/90 242 080 307 016 246 922 I 221 795 199 432 I 179 506 I I I I I 
I 
I l 90/1 243 169 314 565 248 032 I 220 630 196 4 76 I 175 162 i I I l I I i ! 91/2 244 298 I 322 346 249 184 I 219 502 193 593 170 947 i I ' ' I j I I 92/3 245 471 330 372 350 381 I 218 415 190 782 I 166 861 ' I I I ! ' I 93/4 246 687 338 648 251 620 I 217 365 188 039 162 896 
94/5 248 334 347 728 ''253 301 216 693 
I 
185 655 159 298 
95/6 249 263 356 009 254 248 215 391 182 765 155 32 7 
I 96/7 250 627 365 116 255 639 214 467 180 232 151 713 
97/8 252 047 374 529 257 088 213 589 177 767 I 148 212 
I I 
98/9 253 523 384 256 258 593 212 753 175 369 144 822 
TOTALS: $ 4 875 739 4 396 058 3 979 654 3 616 899 
62. 
APPENDIX 68 
C2: READING, BILLING AND f~AINTEN/\NCE COSTS (LOVI ESTIMATE) 
All Figures in 1977/8 Dollars. Base Year for Discounting: 1978/9 
Year [constant Adjusted Discounted 
2% 2% I 
1979/80 179 560 
80/1 223 320 
81/2 211 210 
82/3 234 567 
83/4 235 222 
84/5 235 895 
85/6 236 587 
86/7 237 301 
87/8 238 034 
88/9 238 791 
89/90 239 570 
90/1 240 373 
91/2 241 203 
92/3 242 057 
93/4 242 940 
94/5 243 852 
95/6 244 795 
96/7 245 769 
97/8 246 776 
98/9 247 816 
99/20001248 895 
2000/1 250 012 
01/2 251 168 
02/3 252 368 
03/4 253 610 
186 814 
236 989 
228 620 
258 981 
264 898 
270 970 
277 200 
283 596 
290 161 
296 906 
303 832 
310 949 
318 263 
325 777 
333 506 
341 451 
349 628 
358 039 
366 697 
375 607 
384 787 
394 244 
403 989 
414 037 
424 396 
183 151 
227 786 
215 433 
239 258 
239 9?.6 
240 614 
241 319 
242 046 
242 794 
243 566 
244 361 
245 181 
246 028 
246 898 
247 800 
248 729 
2 49 691 
250 684 
251 712 
252 773 
253 873 
255 012 
256 192 
257 416 
zs8 682 1 
3% I 
181 372 
223 384 
209 219 
230 100 
228 502 
226 932 
225 388 
223 872 I 
222 383 II' 
220 925 
219 494 II 
218 o93 I 
216 721 
215 376 
214 064 
212 780 
211 532 
210 311 
209 123 
207 966 
206 843 
205 754 
204 699 
203 680 
202 695 
4% 
179 629 
219 110 
203 242 
221 378 
217 727 
214 152 
210 6491 
207 221 
i 
203 8631 
200 5791 
I 
197 3631 
194 218 I 
191 1411 
I 
188 1281 
185 1841 
182 3031 
179 490 1 
176 7381' 
174 050 
171 422 
168 857 
166 355 
163 911 
161 526 
159 200 
$ 6 080 925 5 351 208 4 548 436 
5% 
161 377 
214 956 
197 491 
213 064 
207 555 
202 202 l 
197 001 
191 949 ! 
187 o4o I 
:~~ ::: ! 
173 148 I 
I 168 ?sz I 
164 540 1 
l 
15o 422 1 
156 423 ! 
152 542 i 
148 773 i 
14S 114 I 
~4~ ~~~ I 
138 116 II 
134 772 
131 527 
128 380 l 
125 325 1 
I 
4 201 980 I 
l 
63. 
APPENDIX 7A 
C3: LOSS OF CONSUMERs• SURPLUS (HIGH ESTIMATE) 
All Figures in 1977/8 Dollars. Base Year for Discounting: 1978/9 
Year Constant Adjusted Discounted (-2%) 2% 3% 4% 
1979/80 2 427 2 333 2 287 2 265 2 243 2 222 
80/1 4577 4 313 4 146 4 065 3 988 3 912 
81/2 6 286 5 807 5 472 5 314 5 162 5 016 
82/3 5 683 5 147 4 755 4 573 4 400 4 234 
83/4 4 862 I 4 335 3 926 3 739 3 563 3 397 
84/5 7 002 6 096 5 413 5 105 4 818 4 549 
85/6 7 002 5 976 5 202 4 859 4 541 4 247 
86/7 7 002 5 859 5 001 I 4 625 4 281 3 966 l 
87/8 7 856 6 445 5 393 I 4 940 4 528 4 155 
88/9 10 061 8 092 6 638 I 6 021 5 467 4 968 I I I I I I I 
89/90! 12 620 9 951 8 003 I 7 189 6 464 5 818 I 
90/1 1 
I I I I I 15 580 12 044 9 497 i 8 447 7 523 6 707 I l I I I 91/2 I 18 977 14 382 I 11 118 9 793 8 637 7 627 I I 92/3 22 885 17 004 12 887 11 242 9 819 8 588 
93/4 27 310 19 887 14 776 12 765 11 042 9 566 
94/5 33 898 24 209 17 635 15 086 12 925 11 090 
95/6 37 929 26 556 18 965 16 067 13 633 11 586 
96/7 44 272 30 390 21 278 17 851 15 001 12 628 I 
97/8 51 369 34 570 23 730 19 715 16 408 13 680 
98/9 59 304 39 127 26 331 21 644 17 857 14 747 
TOTALS: $ 212 453 185 325 162 300 142 703 
64. 
APPENDIX 78 
C3: LOSS OF CONSW~1ERS' SURPLUS (LOW ESTH1ATE) 
All Figures in 1977/8 Dollars. Base Year for Discounting: 1978/9 
Year Constant Adjusted Oi s counted (-2%) 2% 3% 4% 5% 
1979/80 2 462 2 366 2 320 2 297 2 275 2 253 
80/1 I 4 733 4 460 4 287 4 203 4 124 4 045 81/2 6 570 6 070 5 720 5 555 5 396 5 243 
82/3 6 216 I 5 630 5 201 5 002 4 813 4 632 
83/4 7 000 I 6 216 5 630 5 362 5 109 4 870 
84/5 7 000 I 6 094 5 411 5 104 4 816 4 547 
85/6 7 000 I 5 974 5 201 4 857 4 540 4 246 
86/7 7 000 I 5 857 4 999 4 624 4280 3 964 I I I I 87/8 7 000 ! 5 742 4 805 4 401 4 034 I 3 701 l i I 88/9 7 000 I 5 630 4 619 4 189 3 803 3 456 I I I I I 89/90 7 282 
I 
5 742 4 618 4 148 3 730 3 357 
90/1 8 941 6 912 5 450 4 848 4 317 I 3 849 ! i 
91/2 10 473 
I 
7 937 6 136 5 405 4 767 
I 
4 209 I I I I I 92/3 12 863 I 9 557 7 243 I 6 318 5 519 4 827 
I 
93/4 14 948 I 10 889 8 091 
I 
6 989 6 046 I 5 238 
94/5 17 638 I 12 596 9 176 7 849 6 725 
I 
5 770 I 
I I I 6 294 I l 95/6 20 605 14 427 10 303 I 8 729 7 406 I I 
96/7 23 932 16 428 11 502 9 650 8 109 6 826 
97/8 27 637 18 599 12 767 10 607 8 828 7 360 
v 
98/9 31 747 20 946 14 096 11 597 9 559 7 894 
99/2000. 36 307 23 485 15 495 12 624 10 306 8 430 
2000/1 41 351 26 223 16 962 13 686 11 065 8 964 
01/2 46 921 29 172 18 500 14 781 11 836 9 498 
02/3 53 066 32 345 20 110 15 912 12 619 10 029 
03/4 59 834 35 756 21 794 17 077 13 413 10 559 
TOTALS: $ 230 436 195 814 167 435 144 061 
APPENDIX SA 
C4: OPERATIONAL COSTS OF PRODUCING EXCESS-I·iATER (HIGH FSTH~ATl:.) 
All Figures in 1977/8 Dollars. Base Year for Discounting: 1978/9 
j Year Constant Adjusted Discounted (-2~~) 2% 3% 4% I-
1 1979/80 98 563 94 738 92 880 91 978 91 094 
80/1 100 056 94 285 90 624 88 873 87 172 
81/2 101 595 93 859 88 445 85 894 83 441 
82/3 103 181 93 454 88 064 83 033 79 884 
83/4 104 820 93 077 84 303 80 289 76 503 
' 
84/5 106 516 92 729 82 341 77 659 73 285 
85/6 108 271 92 408 80 447 75 136 70 223 
86/7 111~ 086 92 116 78 620 I 72 717 67 308 I 
87/8 1111 118 91 156 
I 
76 276 69 864 64 045 
I 
88/9 1111 118 89 368 73 313 66 948 60 373 
89/901111 118 87 615 70 465 63 295 56 913 
90/1 1111 118 85 898 I 67 730 60 247 53 652 I 
65 100 1 
I 
1111 118 
I I 91/2 84 214 I 57 346 50 576 I I 
92/3 1111 118 82 562 I 62 572 1 54 583 47 678 1 I 
93/4 111 118 80 944 60 142 51 955 44 945 
v 
94/5 J.ll 118 79 356 57 807 49 452 42 369 
95/6 111 118 77 800 55 562 47 071 39 940 
96/7 111 118 76 275 53 405 44 803 37 652 
97/8 111 118 74 779 51 331 42 646 35 493 
98/9 111 118 73 313 49 337 40 592 33 459 
65. 
5% 
90 227 
85 519 
81 079 
76 885 
72 929 
69 196 
65 673 
62 348 
58 760 
54 864 
51 227 
47 831 
44 660 
41 700 
38 936 
36 354 
33 944 
31 694 
29 592 
27 631 
TOTALS: $ 1 428 764 1 303 931 1 196 005 1101 049 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
66. 
APPENDIX 88 
C4: OPERATIONAL COSTS OF PRODUCING EXCESS-WATER (LOW ESTIMATE) 
All Figures in 1977/8 Dollars. Base Year for Discounting: 1978/9 
Year Constant Adjusted Discounted (-2%) 201 3% 4% 5% 10 
1979/80 97 919 94 117 92 271 91 375 90 497 89 635 l 
80/1 99 077 93 362 89 736 88 002 86 318 84 682 
81/2 100 265 92 630 87 287 84 769 82 348 80 017 
82/3 101 486 91 919 84 919 I 
81 669 78 573 75 622 I I 
83/4 102 7 42 91 232 82 631 78 697 74 986 71 483 I I 
84/5 104 033 90 567 80 421 75 848 71 576 67 582 I 
85/6 105 361 89 925 78 285 73 117 68 336 63 908 l 86/7 106 730 89 307 76 223 70 499 65 256 60 446 
87/8 1108 137 I 
88 710 74 229 67 989 62 326 57 183 I 88 138 I 72 304 65 583 59 543 
54 109 88/9 109 589 I 
89/90 111 092 I 87 595 70 449 63 280 56 900 51 2Ei 
90/1 111 092 85 877 67 713 60 232 53 639 47 820 I 
I 91/2 jl11 092 84 194 65 085 57 332 50 565 44 650 ! I 
92/3 1111 092 I 82 542 62 557 54 570 47 666 41 689 I 93/4 111 092 80 925 60 128 51 942 44 935 38 926 I I I 
94/5 jlll 092 I 79 337 57 793 49 440 42 359 39 345 I 
I I 95/6 1111 092 I 77 782 I 55 549 47 060 39 931 33 936 
96/7 111 092 76 257 53 392 44 793 37 643 31 686 
I 97/8 111 092 74 762 51 319 42 636 35 485 29 586 
98/9 111 092 73 296 49 326 40 582 33 451 27 624 
99/2000 111 092 71 859 47 411 38 o28 31 534 25 793 
2 000/1. 111 092 70 450 45 570 36 768 29 727 24 083 
01/2 111 092 69 069 43 801 34 997 28 023 22 48? 
02/3 111 092 67 714 42 099 33 311 26 417 20 996 
03/4 111 092 66 387 40 465 31 707 24 903 19 604 
TOTALS: $ 1 630 963 1 464 826 1 322 937 1 201 107 
67. 
APPENDIX 9 
RESULTS OF COST -BENEFIT ANALYSIS (base 1978/9) 
Benefits/Costs High Estimate ($) Low Estimate ($) 
(a} For the 2% rate of discount 
Costs: Cl- meter installation 
C2 - meter running costs 
C3- consumers• surplus 
C4 - operational costs 
Annual Equivalent: 
Benefits: 
3 946 499 
4 375 739 
212 453 
1 428 764 
10 463 455 
615 094 
Bl - pipeline deferred 28 582 794 
82 - restrictions avoided 42 840 
B3 - operational (negative) 
costs 
Annual Equivalent: 
(b) For the 4% rate of discount 
Costs: Cl- meter installation 
C2 - meter running costs 
C3- consumers' surplus 
C4 - operational costs 
Annual Equivalent 
Benefits: 
B1 - pipeline deferred 
82 - restrictions avoided 
83 - operational (negative) 
costs 
Annual Equivalent: 
1 169 283 
29 794 917 
2 461 120 
3 604 329 
3 979 654 
162 300 
1 196 005 
8 942 288 
637 406 
25 901 753 
39 257 
1 029 354 
26 970 364 
2 553 257 
5 942 363 
6 080 925 
230 436 
1 630 963 
13 884 687 
690 055 
28 582 794 
42 840 
1 428 706 
30 054 340 
2 004 685 
4 841 601 
4 548 436 
167 435 
1 322 937 
10 880 409 
680 755 
25 901 753 
39 257 
1 219 657 
27 160 667 
2 145 503 
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